C O m m O n K n O w l e D g e 222 ern horn with valves can play this note easily to everyone's complete satisfaction, and Gossett suggests that the composer's final decision be set aside and the horn restored with the modern instrument. This makes for genuine fidelity to the composer's conception. 1 I have yearned to send this passage for comment to Antonin Scalia (but have thought better of it). Wearing a costume first worn onstage by Plácido Domingo in 1986, Justice Scalia appeared as an extra in a 1994 production of Ariadne auf Naxos, so his interest in the orchestration of opera may be presumed. I would like to consult him, however, not as an amateur of opera but as a professional interpreter of publicly consequential texts. What would Justice Scalia -an "originalist" who rejects the idea of the U.S. Constitution as "a 'morphing' document" 2 -make of Gossett's advice "that the composer's final decision be set aside"? And what would he make of Rosen's characterizing the result as one of "genuine fidelity to the composer's conception"? If today an orchestra no longer must turn to a cello to produce the sound that Donizetti had wanted a horn to play, then which of the two options should be regarded as anachronistic? Who would be the real conservative here -the opera director who leaves the melody with the cello, or the one who gives it to the horn? For if the former were the conservative, the latter would be not radical but reactionary. A radical (or do I mean antinomian?) director would assign the melody to a sitar or bagpipe.
An experiment worth enduring would bring Justice Scalia to consecutive performances of Don Pasquale, one with the cello playing the melody in question, and one with the horn. If the amateur's ear found the latter better -more "Donizettian" -perhaps his jurist's eye would begin to read the Constitution a bit differently. I put the point in this way, because I take seriously the arguments that Helen Vendler, Drew Gilpin Faust, Martha Nussbaum, Michael Wood, and others have made recently in support of the arts, or of the study of the arts, as a highest-order training for the mind -for the mind of a judge, as much as for the mind of an art or music or literature critic. It is one thing for a judge to be faced, at the height of his career and authority, with an argument he can instantly (to his own satisfaction) refute. It is quite another for him to spend two nights at the opera, holding a score -the conductor's equivalent of a legal statute -and listening with passionate concern. I am neither a lawyer nor a musician, so there is no point in my suggesting parallels or comparisons between the case of Don Pasquale and any case that has faced the Supreme Court. I can cite, however, the testimony of Elena Kagan, now Justice Scalia's most junior colleague, at her Sen- My assumption, at all events, is that Justice Scalia, however resonant he found the case of Horn v. Cello, would ultimately respond to any legal parallel that one could suggest in the way that Rosen responds to Gossett's viewpoint.
Gossett, Rosen confides to his audience, "has a more generous spirit and a larger tolerance than I do." But generosity and tolerance, both synonyms for liberality, seem almost beside the point -the point being the distinction not between liberality and authenticity, but between authenticity and integrity. As Rosen himself observes, Gossett's touchstone is "the concept of integrity":
It might seem as if integrity has here displaced the not quite totally devalued concept of authenticity. We might say that the addition of ornaments to Bellini and Verdi is authentic in the sense that we know that it was practiced during their lifetimes, but it is also clear that it was less integral to their style than to Rossini's or Handel's.
To gauge the integrity of an opera means to judge what is and is not integral to it, what may and may not be changed without damaging its "musical and harmonic," "aesthetic," "verbal," and "dramaturgical" identity. 4 the use of values and proportionality can help produce constitutional interpretation that allows the Constitution to adapt its permanent values to fit society's changing needs. . . . Other, simpler approaches come with costs attached, such as the difficulty of explaining to the public why it should accept a decision that embodies eighteenth-century factual assumptions or pure judicial intuition. 7
The difference between a "pure" intuitionist and a happily impure one like Justice Breyer appears to be that the latter can and will explain his opinion, to the public's satisfaction. Still, the public of a Supreme Court decision is not, or presumably should not be, the general public, which elects members of Congress, but the parties to the case at hand and (continuing our parallel with music) connoisseurs. For it is only to the connoisseur that finesse and fluency matter. Amendment to the Constitution has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion. The right of "association," like the right of belief (Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624), is more than the right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful. The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
The parallel between these two passages (both published, incidentally, in 1965)
is unmistakable. In arguing that the Bill of Rights has no "penumbras, formed by emanations," Justice Scalia denies with regard to the Constitution what he must affirm, as a Catholic, with respect to the depositum fidei. In this way, if in no other, his hermeneutic seems Protestant, a restatement in American legal terms of the Reformation principle, sola Scriptura.
The aim of my thought experiment -two nights at the opera -is to raise, in contexts to which the issue seems alien, the question of taste. What if the deposit of faith and Douglas's penumbras are regarded as two sorts of patina?
There are cultures that regard patina as dirt -which is to say, in bad taste -but There is, for example, the attack of James Beck on the Sistine Chapel restorations and Kathleen Weil-Garris Brandt's characterization of his ire as symptomatic of "mere culture shock." 10 One wonders, however, if "culture shock" should be thought of as "mere," especially if the person shocked is a scholar of distinction on the objects whose accretions -whether patina, deposit, or penumbra -have been purged without his advice and consent. Beck's indignation may differ in import, but not really in kind, from the trauma entailed by, say, the stripping of the altars during the English Reformation. 11 In both instances, cherished accretions were destroyed so that cherished originals might be restored.
In his analysis of one such case -the "fury and battles" at La Scala "for a high c" that was not sung -Gossett demonstrates the fluency, finesse, and ear required to ease tensions of this kind. 12 The third act of Il Trovatore ends in practice, though not in printed editions, with a high c that operagoers eagerly await.
Riccardo Muti, acting, as he put it, in the "cause of fidelity," directed productions of Il Trovatore, in 1977 and 2000, in which the third act ends on a g, as Verdi intended. What followed was, again and predictably, culture shock -"fury and battles," as La Repubblica reported. But "why should anyone care so much?" Gossett asks us rhetorically, and then answers:
Musical analysis, which can be invoked to support all sides of an argument, is painfully unsuited to this kind of question. But there is a rela- Per l • B e t w e en Te x t and Pe r f or mance 227 tively simple explanation -a historical explanation, not a musical one. Verdi wrote the role of Manrico for Carlo Baucardé, a tenor whose effective range it presumably reflects. . . . A (which recurs frequently) is the highest note that Verdi expected Manrico to sing easily. . . . The real disaster of the interpolated high c is its effect on the choice of an appropriate tenor to sing the role of Manrico. The sine qua non of an opera house today, as it casts the part, has become the ability of a tenor to let loose a stentorian high c at the end of "Di quella pira." . . . To produce a high c, furthermore, singers generally cut the cabaletta by half and omit the notes that they should be singing with the chorus, so as to preserve breath and energy for the final pitch. At the time of Muti's Trovatore in Florence, one Italian critic commented that the high c, even if not written by Verdi, was a gift that the people had given to Verdi. This bit of sentimentality hides the basic issue. . . . Give me a tenor who can sing Manrico as Verdi conceived the part and chooses to add a ringing high c, and I will join the loggione in applauding him.
"Failing that," Gossett concludes, the tenor should sing Manrico's part as Verdi
This verdict is not originalist and literalist, although Gossett's concern for the composer's intention is always clear. Nor is Gossett an intuitionist (whether of a pure type or an impure), though crucially he does not condemn the interpolation of the crowd-pleasing c. His hermeneutic is not Catholic in tendency (he finds the idea of the high c as a "gift" to Verdi sentimental), nor is it Protestant or humanist (the accretion is allowed, if under exacting conditions). While ethical and scholastic concerns inform Gossett's judgment, it issues ultimately from his "improvisatory fluency" in the relevant "historical idioms." His approach is a tertium quid that is rare in interpretive disciplines beyond the performing arts.
That approach is elaborated throughout this symposium, which Philip Gossett and Roger Moseley have organized. What follows are brief solos, taken from each contribution and selected to preview themes that, in a better world, would edify the ear of any prelate or lawyer whose respect for the arts is inadequately profound.
-Jeffrey M. Perl
Within the textual record, signs of improvisation take the form of absences (of notes that are not there); they are thus confined and disciplined by the scores that envelop and cluster around them. In other words, improvisation-shaped holes pockmark the smooth surface of Western music, its history, and its pedagogical 
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Chopin stopped writing the word rubato in his scores around 1836, but that does not mean the practice stopped; rather, he grew more subtle in the ways he shaped his notation to invite it. And the invitation here is open ended: the following voice of the canon emerges more clearly even if the pianist simply arpeggiates the three dyads, but a more radical solution might be slightly to stagger all notes of the lower voice. In other words, the text invites multiple modes of performance, all of which bend the rigor of the science of the canon to the performing practices that help define the genre. . . . No modern editor would dream of rewriting Chopin's canons; but, in curbing our access to his variants, the same modern editor does no less potential damage by radically curtailing the options available to the performer.
-from Jeffrey Kallberg, "Mechanical Chopin" Given this state of affairs, it has been difficult if not impossible to think of notation in relation to composition: notation has become associated with reconstruction as a phenomenon of historical interest. But at the same time, the sense of the score -and hence some notion of notation -seems to remain within the body and the mind of the dancer as a danced possibility. That is to say, some form of cognitive mapping takes the place of the idea of notation and takes root in the dancer's mind and body (if not on paper). Literal notation is not just secondary but tertiary with respect to this sense of scoring that preexists notation in the mind and the body, making of dance a form that places particular demands on the performer. 
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Thus the music manuscript does not preserve a longer song than the one in the play; rather, the manuscript is a source for the full play song, which is not present beyond a long cue in whatever text it was (presumably a prompter's book) that underlay the Wild-Goose Chase. person. And as this is so, even when one says the same things one will say them differently. One could, of course, simply inflect them differently while playing the same notes, but is that sufficient? Is it possible to know? In the case of this piece, it is in fact possible, because it was dedicated to one of Mozart's pupils, Therese von Trattner. When Mozart notated a piece, he thought about his own performance needs, not those of the pupil, whose needs would be accommodated later. This is the difference between the connoisseurs and the amateurs, the Kenner and the Liebhaber: the professional musicians will improvise, the students need to be given a pony.
-from Robert Levin, "Text and the Volatility of Spontaneous Performance"
